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Has the Elite Foundation Agenda Spread
Beyond the Gates? An Organizational
Network Analysis of Nonmajor
Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
JOSEPH J. FERRARE
University of Kentucky
KATHERINE REYNOLDS
Boston College
Previous research focusing on major philanthropic foundations suggests that these
actors have collectively converged around a set of jurisdictional challengers pro-
moting market-based education reforms. Using correspondence analysis, network
analysis, and geographic information science, this article empirically tests whether
this convergence has permeated to less prominent foundations and their grantees,
or if these foundations are pursuing alternative organizational strategies to shape
K–12 outcomes. The analysis draws from a sample of 15 nonmajor foundations
and their 1,069 grantees serving some aspect of K–12 education in 2010. We find
that nonmajor foundations have adopted some elements of major foundations’
organizational strategies to influence K–12 education but that their strategies are
heterogeneous and reflect both challenges to—and opportunities for—a more
varied and democratic structure of policy making.
Elite (or major) foundations involved in education—those who wield dispro-
portionate influence through their financial and social capital—have received
substantial attention in research literature and popular media in the past de-
cade. The heightened attention is, in part, driven by the amount of influence
these foundations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) are perceived to
have over education policy. Yet, this is not explicitly about dollars and cents.
Although the amount of foundation dollars flowing into the realm of K–12 ed-
ucation has been increasing, philanthropic funds still provide only a small sliver
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of total spending in education when compared to state budgets. Instead, the in-
fluential power of foundations arises from their ability to create, sustain, and
transform networks of organizations that can collectively mobilize the resources
needed to shape education policy across local, national, and international scales
(Ball and Junemann 2012; Scott and Jabbar 2013).
Collective action among philanthropic foundations has an extensive his-
tory. Between 1920 and 1940, for instance, a coalition of major foundations
led a coordinated effort to bring structural changes to higher education. Consis-
tent with the broader trend of social efficiency at the time, these foundations—
which included the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations—worked to trans-
form institutions of higher education through the implementation of a corpo-
rate model of governance (Barrow 1990). Today these types of coalitions re-
main actively involved in shaping all levels of education policy. For example, in
Washington State’s 2012 general election, a national network of philanthro-
pists, corporate executives, and nonprofit organizations collectively worked to
narrowly pass a statewide charter-school initiative that had been rejected by
voters in three consecutive elections (Au and Ferrare 2014). In fact, research
suggests that major foundations are strategically converging on (i.e., cofunding)
a limited group of organizations across the United States—called jurisdictional
challengers—that offer alternative educational services (e.g., credentialing, school
management, teacher training) long controlled by traditional institutions such
as public school districts and colleges of education (Mehta and Teles 2012;
Reckhow 2010; Reckhow and Snyder 2014). Prominent jurisdictional chal-
lengers such as Teach For America, New Schools Venture Fund, and Knowl-
edge Is Power Program have been direct beneficiaries of these networks and
have had a profound impact on the national conversation about school re-
form (Kretchmar et al. 2014; Scott and Jabbar 2014; Zeichner and Pena-
Sandoval 2015).
The existing evidence makes it clear that elite foundations are collectively
acting through a network of jurisdictional challengers to shape specific education
policy outcomes, but it is not clear whether these same strategies extend to less
influential foundations. The primary objective of this study is to empirically test
whether less prominent (or nonmajor) foundations have converged on the same
types of grantees, or if these foundations’ giving patterns represent competing
organizational strategies of K–12 education policy and reform. To test our hy-
pothesis we replicate and extend portions of the organizational network analysis
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design used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014). Whereas their study examined the
top 15 giving foundations in K–12 education, we focus on 15 foundations that
were substantially less prominent but still engaged in similar domains of edu-
cation policy in 2010. Thus, unlike Reckhow and Snyder’s longitudinal analysis,
here we focus solely on giving patterns at one point in time (in 2010). Yet, with the
insights from their findings, we are able to assess whether the giving patterns
among major foundations in 2010 had permeated into less prominent positions
within the philanthropic field and to consider the implications these forms of
giving have on recipient organizations and the broader realm of education policy
in which they are situated.
In addition to our network analytic approach, we use basic techniques from
geographic information science (GIS) and cartography to examine the distri-
bution of these foundations’ funding and network patterns. The geographic di-
mensions to these practices are important to investigate so we can determine
whether nonmajor foundations are engaged in national efforts or are primarily
seeking to build local networks of organizations to shape education. Further,
these illustrative techniques allow us to assess whether substantial interstate gaps
exist in philanthropic funding flows that may leave some states and their resi-
dent nonprofit educational organizations without access to the vital funds pro-
vided by philanthropic foundations. In this sense, our analysis opens the door to
understanding forms of geographic stratification that emerge through philan-
thropic involvement in education.
At a more general level, our work contributes to a long tradition of schol-
arship that has raised important questions from a wide range of perspectives
concerning the role of private wealth in shaping the direction of public edu-
cation and social policy in the United States (e.g., Arnove 1982; Faber and
McCarthy 2005; Lagemann 1983; Reckhow 2013; Saltman 2010). In fact, the
use of network analysis has been a crucial tool in this tradition, dating back to
at least the mid-1970s and including Mary Anna Culleton Colwell’s (1980)
“The Foundation Connection: Links Among Foundations and Recipient Or-
ganizations.” Colwell’s rich empirical account found a tightly connected foun-
dation “club” linked directly to the policy-making process. As a result, Colwell
called into question whether these networks of foundations and nonprofits ac-
tually constitute a viable alternative to businesses and government bodies work-
ing to advance education and social policy.
Nearly all of the work in this tradition has focused on foundations whose
endowments were derived from prominent wealthy elites—such as Carnegie,
Rockefeller, and Gates—who captured public attention with their success in
the private sector. In recent years this conversation has gained momentum with
the proliferation of venture philanthropic practices and the availability of data
to analyze these patterns. Yet, missing from this discussion is the role of less
prominent foundations whose financial contributions to education are smaller
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than those of their elite counterparts but in the aggregate constitute a sizeable
portion of the total funds given to organizations that serve public education.
Gaining a deeper understanding of nonmajor foundations’ organizational strat-
egies vis-à-vis elite philanthropic actors extends our understanding of how foun-
dations shape education and informs the debate over whether and how private
power can be used to service the public good. Thus, while our primary objective
is to test the hypothesis described above, we also intend for this work to con-
tribute to the broader conversation concerning the role of philanthropic in-
volvement in shaping education policy in a democratic society.
Philanthropic Foundations and Education Policy Networks
The scholarly literature focusing on philanthropic involvement in education
policy has been quite prolific in recent years. Although the active role of phi-
lanthropists in education is certainly not anewphenomenon, somehave argued
that the strategy of venture (or “strategic”) philanthropy has become a domi-
nant practice within the philanthropic field (Reckhow 2013; Scott 2009).
Venture philanthropy is an approach to philanthropic giving that closely fol-
lows the principles of venture capital investment. Similar to venture capital-
ists, venture philanthropists seek to maximize returns on investments (e.g., as
measured by achievement growth or graduation rates), expand educational
markets, and fund advocacy organizations that promote a market-oriented
policy agenda (Cohen 2007; Lipman 2011; Scott 2009). Venture philanthropy
represents a departure from the strategies of traditional philanthropists (e.g.,
Carnegie, Rockefeller) who, in addition to sheltering their endowments from
taxes, framed their efforts in terms of the public good and widening access to
public institutions (Scott 2009).
Venture philanthropic practices have accelerated the construction and com-
plexity of policy networks in the realm of education. At the most general level,
policy networks are self-organizing sets of interconnected actors (organizations,
individuals, agencies, etc.) who exchange a variety of resources to achieve de-
sired policy outcomes (Davies 2005). In this sense, policy networks operate as
a form of “government without governing” (Rhodes 1996, 2006). Such networks
have come to play an influential role in multiple policy-making realms as social
democratic contracts have eroded in the context of advanced deregulation,
trade liberalization, and other neoliberal reforms (Harvey 2005; Jones 2012).
Policy networks have become an important form of governance among re-
formers working to advance market-based policies in education (Au and Ferrare
2015; Ball and Junemann 2012). Bureaucratic bodies such as the US Depart-
ment of Education, for example, are using policy networks to mobilize juris-
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dictional challengers to push policy initiatives at state and local levels (Mehta and
Teles 2012). Similarly, and often in concert with federal and state actors, major
philanthropic foundations have found policy networks to be an efficient means of
influencing education policy and reform movements. Scholars have argued that
philanthropists and their foundations serve as central nodes in these networks
that channel resources to a wide variety of think tanks, media, school reform
organizations, charter management organizations, and advocacy groups (Scott
and Jabbar 2014). At the same time, the informal nature of policy networks
allows foundations to maintain a cautious and incremental stance toward their
(potentially risky) engagement in the policy realm (Ferris et al. 2008).
The existing literature on philanthropic foundations and education policy
networks suggests that these networks have converged on a policy agenda that
emphasizes market-based interventions (Ball and Junemann 2012; Reckhow
and Snyder 2014; Saltman 2010; Scott 2009) through discourses of entrepre-
neurship, innovation, and enterprise (Anderson and Donchik 2014; Ball and
Exley 2010; Bell 2015; see also McShane and Hess 2015). A network analysis
conducted by Kretchmar et al. (2014), for example, found that major foun-
dations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Eli and Edythe Broad
Foundation, Walton Foundation, and Fisher Foundation were the primary fi-
nanciers of policy networks working to shape K–12 reform through the pro-
liferation of charter schools, charter management organizations, and alterna-
tive teacher and leadership certification. Similar networks have been observed
in the United Kingdom (Hogan et al. 2015; Olmedo 2014; Santori et al. 2015),
China (Liu 2015), and Chile (Campos-Martinez et al. 2015), suggesting a cer-
tain degree of similarity in education policy networks across national contexts
(Ball 2012; Rizvi and Lingard 2010).
Although the previously cited studies provide significant support for the
thesis that major philanthropic foundations—and the policy networks in which
they are embedded—share a relatively homogenous policy agenda, they do not
demonstrate the extent to which this policy convergence has taken shape over
time. The most compelling evidence for the latter can be found in the work of
Reckhow and Snyder (2014; see also Reckhow 2013). In their longitudinal study,
Reckhow and Snyder demonstrate that since 2000 the top 15 philanthropic
foundations in education have dramatically increased the amount of money
they have given to national advocacy and research organizations while simul-
taneously converging on a select set of jurisdictional challengers. For example,
between 2000 and 2010 these major foundations doubled the amount of money
donated to national advocacy and research organizations from $56.3 million
to $110.6 million. In addition, in 2000 the top 15 foundations primarily gave
their money to traditional institutions such as public schools, state departments
of education, and universities, but in 2010 their giving patterns shifted dra-
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matically toward jurisdictional challengers including charter schools, alterna-
tive teacher training, and venture capital (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Another striking finding from Reckhow and Snyder’s study is the extent to
which this policy shift has coincided with organizational convergence (i.e., mul-
tiple foundations funding the same grantees). In 2000, not a single pair of grant-
ees received at least $2 million from three or more of the top 15 education
funders. That number climbed to 10 in 2005 and ballooned to more than 40
by 2010 (Reckhow and Snyder 2014). At the center of this affiliation network in
2010 are the same organizations that have been prominently observed in the
recent case studies noted above, such as Teach For America (TFA), Knowledge
Is Power Program (KIPP), and New Schools Venture Fund (Kretchmar et al.
2014; Zeichner and Pena-Sandoval 2015).
When taken together, the evidence is clear that elite philanthropic foundations
have come to prefer awarding jurisdictional challengers and other organizations
that promote the deregulation of teaching and the adoption of charter schools
and strict accountability measures. Key questions remain, however: To what
extent have these organizational funding strategies permeated into the philan-
thropic field outside of widely recognized major foundations? Are less promi-
nent philanthropic foundations giving to the same types of organizations as ma-
jor foundations, or are their giving patterns reflective of alternative organizational
strategies for shaping education policy and reform? We address these questions
directly in our analysis. Before we do, however, we ground our analysis in a the-
oretical perspective that anticipates both strategic conformity and divergence in
the philanthropic field.
Modeling Philanthropic Involvement in Education Policy Networks
A compelling way to explain the dynamics shaping philanthropic involvement
in education policy is through the concept of institutional isomorphism as de-
veloped by new institutional theorists in organizational studies (e.g., DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). The central premise of new institutional theory is that, in the
face of uncertainty, organizations tend toward similarity through three pro-
cesses of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. For instance, a phil-
anthropic organization looking to award grants in education may follow the
giving patterns of an established and respected organization such as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (mimetic isomorphism). Alternatively, a foundation
may follow certain patterns because of pressure from other organizations or
from cultural expectations circulating through a given domain (coercive iso-
morphism). In the second instance, a foundation situated in a locality with a
strong teachers’ union may face pressure to maintain funding to a local public
Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
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school district rather than a competing charter management organization. Fi-
nally, a philanthropic organization may implicitly follow funding patterns be-
cause it tends to hire senior staff that has recognizable experiences or affiliations
with other foundation executives (normative isomorphism).
Institutional theory has proved to be a productive line of research in orga-
nizational studies in general and in the realm of education in particular (Meyer
1977;Meyer and Rowan 1978). However, although institutional theory has been
successful at explaining conformity in educational organizations, it has not been
able to adequately explain the emergence and transformation of organizational
fields and the extent to which even stable fields are shaped by power relations
(Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012). In light of these shortcomings, the orga-
nizational strand of field theory (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Fligstein and
McAdam 2011, 2012; Mohr 2013) is better equipped to assist analysts in un-
derstanding the contentious and dynamic nature of philanthropic giving in the
realm of education policy.
Organizational field theory shares much in common with institutional the-
ory in the assumption that “strategic action fields are the fundamental units of
collective action in society” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 3). Whereas insti-
tutional theory emphasizes stability and conformity among actors in organi-
zational fields, organizational field theory understands these fields as relatively
autonomous domains of action constituted by positions of incumbents and
challengers (and sometimes governance units; Fligstein and McAdam 2011,
2012).1 Incumbents are those organizations that wield disproportionate influ-
ence in the field. A clear example in the present context is the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, as it donates the largest sums of money, captures extensive
media attention, and is routinely invited to weigh in on education policy issues
with elected officials and other policy elites. Challengers, meanwhile, are those
who occupy less prominent positions vis-à-vis incumbent actors and thus typi-
cally exert little influence over the direction of the field. Nevertheless, chal-
lengers may advance alternative visions while conforming to dominant strate-
gies. For example, in 2010 the Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation
donated to jurisdictional challengers such as charter schools, but it gave its
largest sums of money to state departments of education2—which were then
marginal recipients among incumbent actors (see Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Thus, even during times of relative stability and apparent homogeneity, or-
ganizational field theory assumes that there are always competing visions of
education within the philanthropic field.
Organizational field theory’s emphasis on differential power relations means
that it is also well equipped to explain change. For example, education policy
analysts often cite the perceived failure of the Annenberg Challenge as a turning
point in the philanthropic field (Colvin 2005; Reckhow 2010) that effectively
created space for organizations such as the Bill andMelinda Gates Foundation to
Ferrare and Reynolds
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try new forms of strategic action (e.g., venture philanthropic strategies). Yet it was
not simply the widespread perception of failure that led to change but also the
social skill (Fligstein 2001) possessed by then challengers such as Gates to read the
situation and engage other organizations toward collective action. In addition,
such dramatic changes to strategic action fields are only possible if alternative
visions are present within the field during times of apparent stability. In this way,
field theory anticipates that change is always a possibility given the right con-
ditions.
Organizational field theory is used in the present context to position a sample
of less prominent organizations as challengers within the strategic action field of
philanthropic organizations in K–12 policy. We test whether these challengers
are conforming to the market-based funding strategies of incumbent actors (i.e.,
major foundations) or pursuing alternative organizational strategies to influence
K–12 education. Our theoretical approach generates a number of hypotheses.
First, we anticipate that in 2010 our sample of challengers primarily exhibited
funding patterns that diverged from those of their incumbent counterparts. Sec-
ond, we hypothesize that our sample of challengers did not act as a homoge-
neous group but instead was comprised of factions as reflected in their patterns
of giving to K–12 education. That is, we expect some challengers to have be-
haved more like incumbents and others to have followed patterns of giving that
reflect alternative visions of education policy. Further, we hypothesize that these
expected behaviors hinge, in part, on the geographic scale and proximity in
which challengers act in the philanthropic field vis-à-vis other foundations en-
gaged in similar activities. Intuitively, our theoretical perspective expects that
nonmajor foundation dollars flowed at primarily local scales where these or-
ganizations believed they could have the greatest impact. Yet, the convergence
of grant funding—multiple foundations donating funds to the same organiza-
tions—primarily hinged on the proximity of other foundations. Each of these
hypotheses has important implications for the broader role that foundations play
in shaping K–12 education policy.
Sampling, Data, and Method
The sampling strategy in this study was to identify foundations outside of the
top 15 in 2010 (in dollars given) that had similar giving profiles to the top 15
foundations across a range of K–12 policy domains. The primary reason we
chose to focus on 2010 was so that we could make a direct comparison between
our sample and the sample of top 15 foundations used by Reckhow and Snyder
(2014). Although more recent foundation data are available, we cannot as-
sume that the giving patterns of the top 15 foundations remained the same.
Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
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This direct comparison allows us to assess the similarities and differences be-
tween incumbent and challenger foundations as they occurred in 2010.
The first step in our sampling procedure was to draw from the Foundation
Center’s 2010 Top 50 Foundation Funding lists3 for 11 domains of elemen-
tary and secondary education policy: accountability, arts education, college
and career preparation, early learning, standards, literacy and reading skills,
low-performing schools, out-of-school and summer, rural education, STEM,
and teacher quality and leadership. These lists produced a total of 230 phil-
anthropic foundations. A foundation-by-policy domain matrix was then cre-
ated in which each cell illustrates the percentage of total dollars that foun-
dation i awarded to policy domain j. The next step was to identify 15 of the
230 foundations whose award patterns across the 11 policy domains were most
similar to those of the top 15 foundations identified by Reckhow and Snyder
(2014). To select the subset of foundations in a nonarbitrary way, we used cor-
respondence analysis (CA) to position and subsequently select the foundations
relative to the top 15 foundations’ patterns of K–12 giving. As a data reduction
technique, the goal of CA is to represent dissimilarities between objects (in this
case, organizations and policy domains) in a contingency table as Euclidean
distances in a multidimensional space (Greenacre and Blasius 2006).
The CA (principle coordinates method) resulted in 10 dimensions that to-
gether accounted for 100% of the variation in the original matrix. The 10 di-
mensional coordinates for each foundation were then sorted in descending
order by the factors explaining the greatest amount of variance. Each of the
top 15 foundations was then located in the list, and the foundation outside the
top 15 with the closest coordinates was selected for inclusion in the sample. In
some cases the closest foundation was another top 15 organization, and these
foundations were treated as a cluster and the nearest foundation was chosen
based on the closest distance to the cluster of top 15 foundations. The result was
a sample of 15 foundations that had themost similar giving profiles to the top 15
foundations in 2010 across the 11 policy domains.
As shown in table 1, the foundations in our sample are primarily engaged in
funding education, arts and culture, and a variety of issues dealing with com-
munity vitality. The average market value of the foundations in our sample was
slightly more than $596 million in 2010, with a minimum of $49.9 million (Ford
Motor Company Fund) and a maximum of $1.9 billion (Kauffman Foundation).
Most of the foundations derived their assets from the wealth of business moguls.
Many of these foundations were started and led by widows, such as Minnie K.
Grable (wife of Errett, founder of Rubbermaid) and Grace A. Dow (wife of
Herbert, founder of Dow Chemical). These foundations typically (though not
exclusively) focus on funding local and regional programs in Pennsylvania and
Michigan, respectively. Many other foundations, such as Bradley andKauffman,
are focused on local, state, and national scales, particularly through programs
Ferrare and Reynolds
NOVEMBER 2016 145
This content downloaded from 128.163.008.074 on December 05, 2017 08:28:53 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE 1
Sampled Foundations as Derived by Correspondence Analysis of Giving Profiles across 11 Policy
Domains in K–12 Education
Sampled Foundation (Closest
Top 15 in 2010a) Area of Emphasis
2010 Market
Value ($)
1. TheGrable Foundation (Gates) Early childhood, school systems,
out-of-school time, community
vitality
257,236,911
2. The Herbert H. and Grace
Dow Foundation (Walton,
Carnegie)
Education, science, arts and cul-
ture, community vitality
434,609,837
3. Barr Foundation (Kellogg) Arts and culture, education, cli-
mate, global
1,134,513,133
4. Druckenmiller Foundation
(Dell)
Education, poverty 864,200,491
5. Open Society Institute (Silicon
Valley)
Education and youth, governance
and accountability, health,
media and information, rights
and justice
1,141,004,097
6. The Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation, Inc. (Robertson,
Comm. Fnd. of Texas)
Democratic capitalism, limited
government, defending Ameri-
can ideas, supporting markets,
enlightened citizenry
561,556,697
7. Ford Motor Company Fund
(Carnegie)
Community vitality, education,
driving safety
49,885,020
8. Altman Foundation (Hewlett) Education, health, community
vitality, arts and culture,
nonprofits
246,129,529
9. The Noyce Foundation (Broad) Teaching math and literacy,
school leadership, science edu-
cation, education policy
143,727,641
10. Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation (GE)
Education, entrepreneurship,
Kansas City
1,892,243,801
11. Claude Worthington
Benedum Foundation ( James
Irvine)
Education, economic develop-
ment, health and human
services, community vitality
366,704,435
12. W. M. Keck Foundation
(Fisher)
Research, undergraduate educa-
tion, southern California
1,167,429,096
13. Deutsche Bank Americas
Foundation (Comm. Fnd.
of Texas)
Community vitality, education,
arts and culture
23,007,901
14. The Charles Hayden Foun-
dation (Daniels)
Education, children and youth 281,953,712
15. The Ralph M. Parsons
Foundation (Ford)
Social impact, health, higher ed-
ucation, civic and cultural de-
velopment
388,666,935
NOTE.—In 2 instances a selected foundation had coordinates positioned between 2
of the top 15 foundations. In these instances, we listed both of the top 15 foundations.
a The top 15 counterparts were taken from Reckhow and Snyder (2014).
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that promote free enterprise and limited government. The Open Society Insti-
tute, on the other hand, founded by the hedge-fund manager George Soros, is
active in more than 70 countries around the world.
Following the sample construction, we entered all K–12 education-related
grants for each of the 15 nonmajor foundations into a database. Grant infor-
mation for the foundations was gathered from 2010 Form 990s as provided by
the Foundation Center’s 990 Finder.4 Building from Reckhow and Snyder’s
thematic scheme (see 2014, app. B, 195), each recipient organization was then
coded based on the type of organization (e.g., national advocacy, public school,
state department of education). In the data set, then, each foundation has as
many row entries as grants given, where the row indicates the recipient orga-
nization, state of residency, organization type, and amount of the award. In the
aggregate, our sample of foundations awarded 1,549 grants and $162.5 million
(inflation adjusted) to 1,069 organizations serving some aspect of K–12 educa-
tion across the United States. In comparison, their top 15 counterparts awarded
2,600 grants totaling more than $843 million (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Affiliation Network Analysis and GIS
We use a combination of three analytic strategies to test our research questions:
descriptive statistics, affiliation network analysis, and geographic information
science (GIS). Unlike traditional network graphs, which depict direct connec-
tions between actors, an affiliation network graph depicts relations between
qualitatively different sets of actors or events (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In
the present case, we examine a set of foundations and their giving patterns to a
set of recipient organizations. In doing so, we are able to explore the full duality
of these sets of organizational actors (Breiger 1974; Mohr and Guerra-Pearson
2010). That is, affiliation graphs allow us to examine the degree of (dis)simi-
larity between foundations by virtue of the types of organizations they cofund
as we investigate the types of organizations that become affiliated through the
funders they share in common.
We also use directed affiliation network graphs to assess the degree of con-
vergence among our sample of foundations. Reckhow and Snyder (2014) used
a similar approach to measure convergence in multiple ways. The authors be-
gan by identifying the percentage of awards that were convergent grants; that
is, the total dollars given to organizations that received awards from two or
more foundations (see also Reckhow 2010). Reckhow and Snyder then raised
the threshold of convergence by analyzing affiliation graphs consisting of pairs
of organizations that received grants from three or more of the same founda-
tions with a minimum of $2 million in total awards.
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Our approach begins in a similar fashion by identifying the proportion of
convergent grants among our sample of foundations. From here, though, we
depart from the approach used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014) in a few im-
portant ways. First, we use two-mode affiliation graphs rather than the one-mode
(i.e., organization-by-organization) graphs used in Reckhow and Snyder’s study.
Although appropriate to the authors’ research questions, the one-mode approach
removes an entire set of actors (the foundations) from the data space, whichmeans
the graph is not able to identify potential variations in giving patterns among
the foundations sampled. Our approach, in contrast, models the full duality of
foundations and recipient organizations. In doing so we are able to examine
the exact foundations that are converging on specific recipient organizations
and to identify unique factions of giving within the network. Second, given
that, by definition, our sampled foundations awarded substantially less money
than those in the top 15, we decided the $2 million threshold would exclude
meaningful patterns of convergence in our sample. Thus, we examine con-
vergence from the more general definition used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014)
instead.
Finally, we use principles of GIS and cartography in combination with our
network analysis to map the geographic patterns of overall funding and conver-
gent giving among our sampled foundations. In particular, we use a choropleth
map to show the distribution of funds by state and a flow map to overlay our
affiliation convergence graph over the geographic space of the United States. A
choropleth map uses shading to highlight geographic areas in relation to a vari-
able—in this case, total funds awarded at the state level. A flowmap simply shows
the direction of flow of some variable over geographic space. These visualizations
illustrate the foundations that are donating and converging in national scales
versus those whose efforts remain on state or local scales. By recognizing that
networks occupy social and geographic space, we can better assess the implica-
tions of nonmajor philanthropic involvement in K–12 education policy.
Results
Nonmajor Foundations and Advocacy
As federal and state roles in education policy have expanded in the past 2 de-
cades, major philanthropic foundations have also shifted their focus away
from local advocacy organizations toward national organizations that engage
in lobbying, research, and other forms of advocacy. In fact, 13.1% of the total
dollars awarded by the top 15 foundations in 2010 were given to national ad-
vocacy organizations (Reckhow and Snyder 2014). However, at smaller scales,
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a similar emphasis on national over local advocacy can be seen among the non-
major foundations in the present sample. For instance, national advocacy and
research organizations focused on K–12 education received 9.5% of the total
dollars given by our sample of 15 challenger foundations in 2010. The top three
funded national advocacy organizations were the Hudson Institute, Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, and the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. The amounts for state and local advocacy organizations, on the
other hand, were considerably lower, at 4.4% and 2.2%, respectively. Thus, al-
though these nonmajor donors in education awarded a somewhat smaller pro-
portion of their grants to national advocacy than did the top 15 foundations,
both followed a similar general pattern favoring national over local advocacy.
Although it is clear that the 15 challenger foundations all emphasized na-
tional advocacy and research at state and local scales, it would be a mistake to
assume that these 15 challenger foundations acted in unison. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate the differentiated structure of advocacy giving at the scalar and or-
ganizational levels, respectively. It can be seen, for example, that Parsons
focused exclusively on the national level of advocacy and research but that
Keck and Benedum gave to state and regional organizations (see fig. 1). Others
focused on two scales. For instance, Noyce andDruckenmiller gave to national
and to state and regional organizations, Dow gave to state and regional and
local organizations, and Hayden and Deutsche Bank gave to national and local
organizations. The organizations positioned toward the center of the graph—
Bradley, Ford Motor Company Fund, Altman, Kauffman, and Barr—spread
their awards across all scales (though not necessarily in equal amounts).
Figure 2 illustrates that the organizational structure of these patterns is sparse
and varied, with most foundations focusing on their own unique sets of advocacy
organizations. Several foundations, it turns out, awarded few grants to advocacy
organizations. Keck and Parsons each awarded grants to only one advocacy and
research organization, and an additional six foundations awarded grants to be-
tween two and five of these organizations. The story is different for the remaining
seven foundations, however. Barr gave at all scales but focused its awards on a
mutually exclusive set of organizations. The Open Society, Ford Motor Com-
pany Fund, and Noyce and Altman Foundations followed a similar pattern, but
they are linked to a larger structure via individual bridge organizations such as
the Afterschool Alliance, Lulac National Educational Service Centers, and the
Aspen Institute. Kauffman and Bradley emerged as unique in this graph for their
convergent funding to five conservative think tanks, the National Council on
Teacher Quality, and the RAND Corporation. This structural and substantive
variation in giving suggests that, in terms of advocacy grants, some challenger
foundations behaved more like incumbent, or major, foundations, and others
used contrasting strategies to develop and promote their educational policy
agendas.
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Traditional Actors versus Jurisdictional Challengers
In addition to advocacy and research, the funding of jurisdictional challengers has
become a dominant policy network strategy among incumbent foundations to
facilitate market-oriented reforms (Mehta and Teles 2012; Reckhow and Snyder
2014). Table 2 provides mixed evidence for this strategy among the present
sample of nonmajor foundations. Following Reckhow and Snyder (2014; see
fig. 1), we consider public schools and districts, universities, and state depart-
ments of education as traditional institutions, and charter schools and networks,
teacher training and recruitment, and venture capital firms as jurisdictional
challengers. We also added school leadership training as a category under juris-
dictional challengers.
As illustrated in table 2, charter schools and organizations (e.g., charter
school networks) received 5.7% of the total foundation awards in 2010, which is
more than twice the amount given to public schools (2.2%) and four times the
amount given to universities (1.4%). Training and recruitment organizations
for teachers (2.6%) and school leaders (2.3%) and venture capital organizations
(3.0%) also received small but nontrivial portions of total grants. In fact, three
of the top five funded organizations in the sample—Harlem Children Zone,
Charter Growth Fund, and New Leaders for New Schools—are jurisdictional
TABLE 2
Percentage of Total Grants and Funding Given to Traditional Institutions, Jurisdictional Challengers,
and Top 5 Organization Types Overall (by Funding)
% of Grants % of Funding
Traditional institutions:
Public schools and orgs 5.1 2.2
Universities .7 1.4
State departments of education .5 .8
Jurisdictional challengers:
Charter schools and orgs 4.4 5.7
Venture capital .5 3.0
Teacher training and recruitment 1.0 2.6
Leadership training and recruitment .6 2.3
Top 5 organization types (by funding):
College access and scholarships 2.8 17.6
National advocacy and research 10.7 9.5
Arts education 12.2 8.8
Afterschool, tutoring, mentoring 9.5 8.2
Other student enrichment 11.3 7.2
SOURCE.—Authors’ own data compiled from foundations’ Forms 990.
Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
152 American Journal of Education
This content downloaded from 128.163.008.074 on December 05, 2017 08:28:53 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
challengers, with the other two being a private school (Spence School) and schol-
arship fund (Kauffman Scholars) that partners with Kaplan K12 Services and
Tutor.com to provide academic support. Even though traditional education in-
stitutions received a meaningful percentage of foundation dollars from this sam-
ple, none of these institutions received as much as any category of or individual
organization within the jurisdictional challengers.
Figure 3 illustrates that, yet again, important variations exist among our
sample of challenger foundations. Starting at the left side of the graph, we can
see that Druckenmiller and Noyce gave almost exclusively to jurisdictional chal-
lengers, with the exception being Noyce’s awards to universities. In contrast,
Dow and Deutsche Bank gave exclusively to traditional institutions falling under
the categories of public schools and universities. Positioned in between are those
foundations that spread their awards across jurisdictional challengers and tra-
ditional institutions, although as indicated by the line weights, some (e.g., Bradley
and Hayden) clearly placed substantial emphasis on the former over the latter in
the number of grants awarded. The most striking feature of the graph, though,
is the positioning of public schools and charter schools. The central position—
and close proximity—of these organizations stems from the fact that 11 of the
15 foundations gave to both types of organizations. That these ostensibly com-
peting organizational forms hang together in the network suggests that, in terms
of awards received from nonmajor foundations, they are quite similar. Yet, as
we saw in table 2, the amount of money given to charter schools is more than
twice that given to public schools. Thus, although our sample of foundations
gave more total grants to public schools (79) than to charter schools (68), the
average size of the grants to charter school and network grants was about three
times that of the mean grant given to public schools and districts.
Examining the organizational structure of giving to jurisdictional challengers
versus that of traditional institutions (see figs. 4 and 5) sheds additional light on
how nonmajor foundations pursue their educational objectives. Figure 4 illus-
trates that many challenger foundations funded their own networks of juris-
dicational challengers but became affiliated through the cofunding of prominent
national organizations. For example, Bradley, Parsons, Kauffman, and Druc-
kenmiller each gave grants to Teach For America but otherwise funded their own
isolated (at least from the sample) set of jurisdictional challengers. Kauffman,
Keck, and Hayden are similar in their affiliation in giving to KIPP. On the other
hand, foundations such as Deutsche Bank, Noyce, and Ford Motor Company
Fund are completely disconnected from any organizational affiliations. The
graph of traditional institutions in figure 5 is quite different. Here we can see
that nearly every foundation funds its own network of public schools and dis-
tricts, with the exceptions of Benedum and Grable, which share the Allegheny
Intermediate Unit in common, and Deutsche Bank and Altman, which co-
funded Teachers College Columbia University.
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To this point we have seen some evidence that these nonmajor foundations are
following the gravity of major foundations in the K–12 philanthropic field. They
have a clear preference for funding national advocacy and jurisdictional chal-
lengers over local advocacy and traditional educational institutions. However,
our sample of foundations did not act as a cohesive group in any of the contexts
explored thus far. Rather, clear factions emerged in both of the organizational
sectors we examined. In addition, as illustrated in table 2, many of the nonprofit
organizational grantees in our sample could not be categorized as either tradi-
tional institutions (e.g., public schools) or jurisdictional challengers (e.g., charter
schools). In fact, organizations offering college readiness services were awarded
more of the total funding (17.6%) than any other type of organization in the
sample. In addition, organizations offering arts education (8.8%), afterschool and
tutoring programs (8.2%), and other forms of student enrichment (7.2%) re-
ceived more funding than any of the traditional institutions and jurisdictional
FIG. 4.—Directed affiliation graph of organizational funding patterns to jurisdictional
challengers. Only foundations and cofunded organizations are labeled.
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challengers. Although these organizations are not directly challenging tradi-
tional governance structures in education, it is clear that they played a crucial
role in the K–12 education objectives of these nonmajor foundations.
Assessing Network Convergence
Between 2000 and 2010 the giving patterns of incumbent foundations in the
realm of education policy converged dramatically (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Recall that convergent grants are those dollars given to organizations from two
or more foundations. Overall, 24% of the funds awarded from our sample
foundations were convergent grants. This is nowhere near the 64% found by
Reckhow and Snyder (2014) in 2010. Instead, it is much closer to the percent-
ages they found among the top 15 in 2000 (23%) and 2005 (35%). Neverthe-
less, the top 5 convergent organizations in our sample—Harlem Children’s
Zone, College Summit, Teach For America, the BELL Foundation, and Hunts
Point Alliance for Children—do reflect the preference for jurisdictional chal-
lengers and college readiness found among the top 15. In other words, some of
the challenger foundations in our sample behaved like incumbents, but many
did not.
Figure 6 illustrates the full duality of convergent giving and receiving among
our sample of foundations and their recipient organizations. At first glance, the
interpretation of this graph may seem overwhelming. However, a closer in-
spection reveals a structure with clearly differentiated clusters. Benedum and
Grable, for instance, form a distinct pair that converged on a variety of orga-
nizations in arts education and advocacy. Keck and Parsons formed a similar
pair that converged on organizations offering arts, advocacy, mentoring, and
other enrichment services. Moving clockwise, we next see that Kauffman and
Bradleymade another unique pairing. As we anticipated, these two foundations
converged primarily on conservative think tanks and research organizations.
Finally, Altman and Hayden make up a fourth distinguishable pair that co-
funded a mix of organizations that span the spectrum of organizational types.
The Barr Foundation also shares a strong affiliation with Hayden through the
cofunding of jurisdictional challengers and other student enrichment services.
Beyond the distinct pairs of foundations and their networks of organizations,
a variety of organizations occupy central positions in the graph. Their cen-
tral positioning indicates that these organizations received multiple grants from
many of the same foundations. These are the organizations that met a higher
threshold of convergence, often receiving grants from three or four founda-
tions in the sample. As anticipated, these organizations include many promi-
nent jurisdictional challengers such as KIPP and TFA, but they also include
long-standing community organizations such as Big Brothers BigSisters and the
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Boys and Girls Club. In addition, a number of newer organizations, such as the
Posse Foundation, BELL Foundation, and City Year, support K–12 students
and prepare them to enter college.
The Spatial Context of Nonmajor Foundation Funding
In this final results section we situate our sampled foundations’ gifts in a geo-
graphic context to gain a deeper understanding of overall patterns of giving and
convergence. In total, 72.4% of funds were awarded to in-state organizations,
and the remaining 27.6% were awarded out of state. The choropleth map in
figure 7 represents the geographic distribution of the total funds given by our
sampled foundations. Organizations in the darkest shaded states received the
greatest amount of funding. Not surprisingly, the darkest shaded states (those
receiving more than $10 million)—California, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
andMassachusetts—are those where 12 of the 15 foundations in our sample are
headquartered. Although a number of funded organizations are located in
states without a sample foundation’s headquarters (e.g., Colorado, Iowa, and
Virginia), there is a significant gap in grant funding between organizations in
the darkest shaded states and those in theMountainWest states andmany states
in the South. This is not simply a feature of our sample, either. Of the 230 foun-
dations from which we drew our sample, only 13 (5.7%) foundations are lo-
cated in the 16 states (including Hawaii and Alaska, not shown) that received
no funding from our sample.
The flow map in figure 8 allows us to examine the geographic dimension to
the network convergence observed in figure 6. The thickness of lines running
from the foundations’ cities to the recipient organizations’ cities corresponds to
the number of recipient organizations in the latter city. The reflexive arcs rep-
resent awards given to organizations located in the same city as the granting
foundation. To reduce clutter in the map, we did not differentiate the lines for
different foundations located in the same cities. To capture the geographic dif-
ferences of foundations in the same city,wepoint to the proportionof within- and
between-city convergence for selected foundations.
A number of geographic patterns of convergence emerge from figure 8.
Most notably, the vast majority (76.5%) of convergent funds were directed to
organizations in New England, with most of this activity occurring in New York
(66.6%). For instance, the close network proximity between Barr, Hayden, and
Altman in figure 6 also corresponds to a distinct geographic proximity (of New
York City and Boston) of convergence in figure 8. Similarly, the convergent
funding of Benedum andGrable is almost entirely localized in Pittsburgh, where
both of these foundations are headquarted.
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Not all of the New England foundations adhered to a local pattern of con-
vergence, however. Nearly half of Open Society’s (43%) and Deutsche Bank’s
(45%) convergence was directed to organizations outside of New York City. On
the other hand, not all of the tendency toward local convergence was confined to
the East Coast. On the West Coast, more than 8 in 10 (82%) of Parsons’s and
Keck’s organizational convergence was within the greater Los Angeles area. Sim-
ilar to Benedum and Grable in Pittsburgh, these LA-based foundations primar-
ily converged on local organizations offering arts and enrichment services.
The Midwest-based foundations—who occupy close positions in figure 6—
follow an interstate pattern of convergence. Kauffman and Bradley best repre-
sent this pattern, with 100% of their convergent giving directed to out-of-state
organizations. Their cofunding of national advocacy and research organizations
explains the thick arcs running toWashington, DC, but they also converged with
other foundations on a number of national jurisdictional challengers (e.g., TFA,
KIPP). Ford Motor Company Fund and Dow also directed a majority of their con-
vergent giving to organizations at nonlocal scales, albeit at substantially smaller
frequencies than Kauffman and Bradley.
The vast majority of convergent funding thus appears to have been driven by
the likelihood of having another foundation in close proximity. Bradley and
Kauffman, for example, simply do not have a counterpart in Wisconsin or Mis-
souri (respectively) with which to converge. This is true of our sample and of the
broader field of foundations engaged in education funding. Of the original 230
foundations from which we selected our sample, only 3 foundations are in Wis-
consin, and only 2 are in Missouri. In contrast, New York (37), California (33),
and Pennsylvania (13) have substantially more foundations involved in these
efforts. Yet, geography does not tell the whole story. The results above clearly
demonstrate that Bradley’s and Kauffman’s national convergence is also driven
by an ideological alignment and commitment to building a network of national
advocacy organizations that promote market-based reform.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our task has been to determine whether nonmajor foundations (i.e., challengers)
tend to mimic the organizational giving patterns of elite foundations (i.e., ma-
jor foundations, or incumbents) that focus their efforts in similar policy niches or
whether they pursue alternative organizational strategies toward these ends. In
short, we set out to test the new institutionalism model against an alternative
field theoretical model. In particular, we hypothesized that our sample of non-
major foundations would exhibit patterns of giving that diverged from their in-
cumbent counterparts, but that they would do so heterogeneously. Whereas in
some instances it is clear that our sample of challenger foundations did follow
Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
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major foundations (i.e., exhibit isomorphism), there is compelling evidence that
most of the foundations pursued divergent and highly varied organizational strat-
egies. In other words, a field theoretical model appears to be a better fit for the
data. In the following, we situate our findings in the literature and discuss im-
plications for education policy.
In the aggregate, our sample of nonmajor foundations did adhere to the in-
cumbent preference of funding national over local advocacy organizations and
jurisdictional challengers over traditional institutions. In addition, we observed
a meaningful degree of organizational convergence for many of these advocacy
groups (e.g., Aspen Institute) and jurisdictional challengers (e.g., TFA). In many
other ways, however, the foundations in our sample gave against the grain of
their elite counterparts. Most important, in 2010 these challenger foundations
engaged in convergent giving much less frequently than those foundations in the
top 15 (see Reckhow and Snyder 2014). This finding is consistent with previous
research that found large foundations to be more likely than small foundations
(in terms of asset size) to engage in collaborative activities such as cofunding ar-
rangements (Ostrower 2004). Others have argued that foundations with national
ambitions are more likely to engage in strategic (or venture philanthropic) forms
of giving to directly shift the direction of education policy (Colvin 2005). In gen-
eral, our findings are consistent with the latter claim.
Our sample of challenger foundations diverged in other important ways. For
example, even though these foundations gave substantially more to charter
schools and networks than to public schools and districts, they still gave only
about a third as much to charters as did the top 15 foundations analyzed by
Reckhow and Snyder (2014), proportionately speaking. Instead, it was college
readiness organizations that were awarded on par (again, in proportion) with
what the top 15 incumbent foundations gave to jurisdictional challengers. In
addition, organizations that promote local arts and after-school programs were
funded at greater amounts overall thanwere any single category of jurisdictional
challenger. As previous research suggests, these foundations may be working to
position themselves within specific educational niches where they expect to have
the greatest impacts (Ferris et al. 2008). Regardless, future research should ex-
amine these college readiness and student enrichment organizations in more de-
tail, and whether foundations have been changing their support for such organi-
zations over time.
We can conclude that there are key similarities and differences in the or-
ganizational strategies between our sample of challenger foundations and their
incumbent counterparts, but it is more accurate to say that some challenger
foundations behave similarly to incumbents and that others act very differently.
As anticipated by our field theoretical model, even when challenger founda-
tions mimicked some of the organizational funding patterns of incumbents, they
simultaneously funded organizations that represented strategies of reform dif-
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ferent from theirs. That is, a clear pattern throughout the affiliation network
analysis is that the aggregate results hide meaningful variation. The approach
taken by Reckhow and Snyder (2014) does not allow us compare the subgroup
structure and our affiliation networks among those foundations in the top 15. It
is plausible, then, that the propensities of major foundations observed in the
aggregate conceal meaningful variations. Future research should explore these
potential variations in more detail and examine the extent to which factions of
major and nonmajor foundations shift over time and place.
We also identified a geographic specificity in these factions through the GIS
analysis. Some factions appeared to mimic one another within geographic
proximity (e.g., Benedum and Grable), whereas others showed similarity across
multiple state boundaries (e.g., Bradley and Kauffman). Thus, in many cases,
geographic proximity appears to structure (or at least correspond to) similarities
and differences in giving patterns, whereas social or ideological proximity ap-
pears to be the underlying process at work in other cases. These theoretical
processes deserve greater attention in future research.
Implications
Several practical implications follow from our analysis of nonmajor philan-
thropic giving in K–12 education. Our results suggest that there is (or at least
was, in 2010) considerable space in the philanthropic field for those organiza-
tions looking to pursue policy objectives running counter to the market-driven
policies that are the current dominant approach to education reform. Indeed,
the foundations examined above demonstrate an extraordinary range of orga-
nizational variation in their patterns of giving. The importance of fostering
diverse educational experiences across the arts, sciences, and humanities was
evident among some factions of foundations, as was support for racial, religious,
and other group-based equity. Many of these foundations also provided vital
funds to a variety of support services and academic enrichment programs that
would otherwise be absent in the current education policy climate in the United
States. Thus, attempts to homogenize the work of foundations—at least at the
time of this analysis—are highly problematic.
On the other hand, because the policy networks are constructed and sus-
tained through philanthropic giving, they are also vulnerable to change. It is
evident that policy networks are a preferred mode of governance for venture
philanthropists, who demandmeasurable results backed by the threat of cutting
off funds and moving on to the next venture. However, for those concerned
about the lack of accountability for policy networks and their philanthropic
financiers, the ephemeral order of these networks poses a meaningful challenge
to democratic approaches to educational governance. Many of the organi-
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zations we have discussed are largely dependent on foundation dollars to sus-
tain their operating budgets. There is a great risk, then, of these services being
cut if foundations decide to shift policy focus. This is true of jurisdictional chal-
lengers and many other nonprofit organizations whose operating budgets are
not financed by tax revenue. Future studies should examine how shifting
patterns of philanthropic giving impact the services of these financially depen-
dent organizations.
From our geographic analysis, we also saw that money tended to flow and
converge locally among our sampled foundations—and this occurred in a rela-
tively limited number of cities and states. This can be welcome news for or-
ganizations positioned in New York or California, but it also means that cities
and states without a substantial base of foundations will be unable to sustain
organizations that rely heavily on foundation dollars. Rural states in the Moun-
tain West and South, in particular, are at a major disadvantage in this regard.
These states may not serve as many students as the urban Midwestern and
coastal areas, but they nevertheless represent a meaningful portion of the US
population and face a litany of educational challenges that directly impact rural
and urban communities (Carr and Kefalas 2009; Tieken 2014). One might
argue that major foundations are better equipped at filling this role, but at pres-
ent we have no research to support this assertion. More extensive GIS work is
needed to gain a deeper understanding of these geographic disparities in foun-
dation awards to education.
The results of our analysis also add to the ongoing conversation concerning
the role of private wealth in shaping public policy. It is no secret that private
foundations allow wealthy individuals and corporations to shield substantial
portions of their wealth from tax liability (Saltman 2010). This provides foun-
dations with exclusive power to shape the direction of public education while
simultaneously diminishing public control over these lost tax revenues. That is,
the growing influence of philanthropic foundations—whether major on not—
comes at the expense of public influence. We have no illusions about the effec-
tiveness of our current democratic system of governance in shaping education,
but in principle there are at least some institutional levers (e.g., judicial, electoral)
that members of the public sphere can push to mobilize educational change. At
present there is simply no such mechanism to challenge the public education
policy ambitions of private foundations.
We do not mean to imply that philanthropic involvement in education policy
is inherently problematic or antithetical to a thriving public education system.
Many of the foundations in our sample exhibited a strong commitment to sup-
porting traditional public schools and community organizations that offer rich
curricula to some of the most disadvantaged students in the United States. Yet,
much like their elite counterparts, others focused their funding efforts on private
organizations working to fundamentally alter the very idea of public education.
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Regardless of one’s support for or opposition to this particular policy agenda,
the key point here is that foundations and the organizations that seek their fund-
ing determine these matters privately. Therefore, although our results demon-
strate that nonmajor foundations represent a wide range of visions for public
education, many of these visions take form with very limited contributions from
those most influenced by their gifts.
Notes
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed feedback and
insightful suggestions.
1. We use the lexicon of Fligstein andMcAdam (2012) because their work is the most
complete and thorough treatment of organizational field theory.
2. The data supporting this assertion came from Benedum’s 2010 Form 990 down-
loaded from the Foundation Center’s 990 Finder, http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders
/990finder/.
3. The 2010 Top 50 Foundation Funding lists were the most recent publicly available
lists from the Foundation Center, http://foundationcenter.org/educationexcellence
/top_lists.html, as of access on June 15, 2014.
4. http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/990finder/, accessed on June 15, 2014.
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